MWANANCHI ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD v REPUBLIC 1985 TLR 243

Facts
The appellant company was charged with and convicted of permitting a defective motor vehicle to be driven on the public road contrary to the Road Traffic Act, 1973. It was sentenced to a fine and ordered to pay Shs.8,000/= as compensation to the owner of Hanother vehicle damaged as a result of the offending act. The defects, as alleged in the charge, were a broken windscreen and a "bog stearing" being out of order. Nobody, not even the trial court magistrate, was able to tell what "bog stearing" meant. The evidence showed that the windscreen was only cracked on one side and the vehicle was I fitted with a security lock in its steering mechanism as a precaution against theft of the vehicle. The locking system and the ignition system were designed to be controlled centrally  and simultaneously such that the lock would open immediately upon igniting the engine A and it would lock upon removing the ignition key. But on the material day the central and simultaneous control had developed some faults: the ignition key continued to control and operate the locking system without igniting the engine and the vehicle had to be started by connecting certain wires. Apparently, after starting the engine, the driver was careless and did not turn the key fully to undo the steering lock. On appeal it was argued, inter alia, that the trial court magistrate should not have relied, as he did, on a motor vehicle inspection report by a person not duly appointed under the Road Traffic Act, 1973.
Held: (i) "Bog stearing" which was referred to as being defective in the charge is something not known to exist in the present motoring world and by containing something which is not known, the charge was defective.
 (ii) as both the prosecution and the defence proceeded on the understanding that "bog stearing" actually meant the steering system, the defect in the charge did not embarrass the appellant and it did not occasion a miscarriage of justice.
 (iii) the Motor Vehicles Inspection Report was improperly admitted in this case because the application of s. 34B(2) of the Evidence Act, 1967 under which it was purportedly admitted 
is in respect of the admission of written statements and not reports  like this one.
 (iv) the admission of the Motor Vehicles Inspection Report was also improper in that the purported report was made by a person who was not a motor vehicles inspector duly appointed by the Minister in accordance with the Road Traffic Act, 1973 and moreover he did not appear to testify in court and his expertise and experience was dubious.
 (v) in view of the evidence showing that the steering system was merely locked due to the carelessness of the driver, a charge alleging defects in the steering system has not been established.
 (vi) the evidence shows that the windscreen was only cracked on one side and it was not letting in water or air; it was not broken as the charge alleged.
 (vii) the order for compensation had no basis in this case and in making it the trial court magistrate acted in excess of jurisdiction

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